Positive Psychology

History in the Remaking?

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ABSTRACT. Positive psychology has figured itself as no less than a revolutionary reorientation of psychology, one that makes individual 'flourishing' the primary object of study and intervention. There are clear comparisons to be made between this movement and earlier ones that have embraced both individualism and an ethos of adjustment, such as the popular mind cures of the late 19th century and the influential mental hygiene movement of the early 20th century. We argue for a focus beyond the individual in isolation, a perspective that takes in the totality of the social environment and an ethical stance that values social engagement and activism. We further call for more nuanced conceptions of happiness, virtue, and strengths, as well as for more socially informed theorizing about human flourishing. Finally, we suggest that positive psychology, with its growing assortment of applied uses, serves to address the acute market pressures facing clinical psychologists today.

KEY WORDS: individualism, positive psychology, self-actualization, social justice

In 2000, Martin Seligman and Mihály Csikszentmihályi published a manifesto for the new century in the lead article of a special issue of the *American Psychologist*, the flagship journal of American psychology (Seligman & Csikzentmihályi, 2000a, 2000b). They called for a revolutionary reorientation of the field, one that would make individual flourishing the primary object for scientific study and professional intervention. Psychological experts have long assumed the authority to tell the truth about the human condition**.** Therefore, when some psychologists assert that psychology can produce scientific truths about human flourishing—happiness, optimism, character, and virtue—we must

ask, in Nikolas Rose's (1998) terms, 'according to what systems of judgment and in relation to what concerns' they will do so (pp. 25–26).

It is Rose's question that we seek to address in this article. How has so-called 'human flourishing' come to be problematized—that is, how has it come to be made into an object of knowledge and a problem requiring social-scientific investigation? How do the claims and concepts put forward by positive psychologists arise from and reaffirm longstanding American preoccupations? What do positive psychologists highlight as problems demanding urgent notice, and what problems do they shunt aside? What has made positive psychology so appealing both within the discipline and in the mass media at this point in time? Scientific ideas do not gain preeminence solely because of their truth. Rather, ideas take hold because they do 'ideological work,' as Mary Poovey (1988) has called it: papering over dilemmas, managing or containing contradictions in order to make ideology appear no more than common sense. What ideological work does positive psychology perform?

We examine these questions by placing positive psychology within the context of North American psychology and its sister disciplines and also within the context of the larger history of ideas that are central to it. Positive psychologists have often compared their movement to that of their immediate predecessors, humanistic psychologists. We examine other historical predecessors of positive psychology. One is New Thought, one of several popular 'mind cure' movements that emphasized the transformational power of thought (Anker, 1999; Hale, 1971; Satter, 1999). Another is mental hygiene, which, like positive psychology, figured itself as a 'movement' and purported to use scientific methods to determine the conditions necessary to produce satisfied, industrious, and well-adjusted individuals. Yet another predecessor is social work, a discipline that, although sharing positive psychology's orientation to shoring up human strengths, has also continually advocated for social change and social justice.

New Thought, Masterful Selves, and Expressive Individualism

The scientific quest for 'healthy mindedness,' as William James put it (1902/1994), is by no means a novel development (Becker, 2005). Prescriptions for attaining happiness and improving our 'selves' have been ubiquitous in American life since colonial times. Moreover, today's positive psychologists can hardly claim to be engineering a cultural shift from a narrative of human weakness and deficiency to an upbeat vision of human strengths and limitless potential. That shift took place long ago in the historical transformation of a colonial society steeped in the Puritan tradition of sin-seeking and conscience-searching to the popular culture of the late 19th century, a period when movements promising happiness, material success, and good health proliferated

(Meyer, 1965). Key among these movements was New Thought, a movement that bears an uncanny resemblance to positive psychology.

Like some of today's positive psychologists, New Thought leaders extolled the transformative, quasi-magical power of positive thinking. Consider Elizabeth Towne's advice to a reader of her regular column in the New Thought journal, *The Nautilus*, over 100 years ago: ' … a cheerful right-thinking attitude of mind ... will cure any kind of disease except broken bones' (as cited in Satter, 1999, p. 27). Towne's advice compares closely to the advice proffered in a 2001 *US News and World Report* story on positive psychology: 'Cheer up! New science tells you how to inject real joy into your life' (as cited in Held, 2005, p. 11). Towne's claim also presages the claims made by Frederickson and Losada in a 2005 *American Psychologist* article. They listed the supposed curative effects of positive affect, including 'increased happiness, ... lower levels of cortisol, ... reduced inflammatory response to stress, ... resistance to rhinoviruses, [and] reductions in stroke' (p. 679). Consider, too, Henry Wood, a prominent New Thought mentor (read: therapist) who instructed his clients to focus attention on cards printed with 'Mental Suggestions' such as 'I Rule The Body' and 'All Things Are Yours' (as cited in Moskowitz, 2001). Wood's prescription is not unlike the mental habits and simple exercises in positive thinking that some positive psychologists prescribe**.** In sum, positive psychology shares with New Thought a faith in the power of the mind to control and even heal the body, a faith steeped in Greco-Christian dualism. Both movements, moreover, hold out the promise of technological advances that will enable us to control our fates, the perennial siren call of American individualism.

When Alexis de Tocqueville toured America in the early 1830s, he was both impressed by and concerned about American individualism. He worried that democratic individualism might lead Americans to imagine erroneously 'that their whole destiny is in their own hands' (Tocqueville, 1840/1945, p. 99). His concern was warranted. The concept of individualism originally referred to equal rights, freedom, and dignity (Lukes, 1973). However, the word 'individualism' was soon supplanted by other terms, such as self-reliance and self-culture, which had different meanings. The writings of Emerson, Thoreau, and others emphasized individuals' need to cultivate their unique qualities and capacities apart from society. Implicit in this Romantic individualism was the view that through the expression of a unique, authentic self, an individual would find satisfaction and personal gratification. These ideas form the basis of our contemporary concept of self-actualization (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985/1996; Cushman, 1995). Further, the emphasis on gratification and feeling good as the endpoint of self-development forms at least part of the architecture of all positive psychologies, past and present. As Woolfolk and Wasserman (2005) have argued, positive psychologists, all pronouncements to the contrary, value positive qualities and virtues not for their intrinsic merit or their salubrious effects on society, but for the good feelings they induce in us.

Mental Hygiene, Moralism, and the Psychology of Adjustment

Although positive psychologists' public image is as 'happiologists,' they have lavished much attention on discussions of values, virtues, and character. In their manifesto on positive psychology, Seligman and Csikszentmihályi (2000b) extolled societies that 'focused on positive qualities ... human virtues ... [and] good character' (p. 13): Athens during the Classical period, Renaissance Florence, and Victorian England. Setting their sights on the elites who flourished in those societies may have blinded them to the larger picture. As students of history are aware, the prosperity, civic life, and high culture of these societies rested on a substrate of class oppression and gender subordination. Seligman and Csikszentmihályi say that democracy was born in 5th-century Athens, but they fail to mention that Athenians did not grant slaves and most women the rights accorded to most men. Victorians may have affirmed 'honor, discipline, valor, and duty' (p. 13), but many also endorsed the self-seeking imperialism that led Britain to conquer much of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean islands, to plunder the natural resources of those lands, and to impose Draconian taxation and revenue policies on their peoples (Metcalf, 1994; Porter, 1996; E.J. Williams, 1970). At home, the vast wealth of the British Empire did little to alter the grim life of the urban and rural underclasses that Dickens and Hardy had so graphically portrayed earlier. Moreover, the Victorian middle-class wife may have been exalted as the 'angel of the house' and her husband's moral compass, but her sphere of influence was highly circumscribed and her primary task was to serve others (Welter, 1966).

Eminent historians of the Victorian period have noted that the Victorian emphasis on virtue conveniently served the needs of the ruling classes. As Gertrude Himmelfarb (1995) has shown, Victorian exhortations to virtue spoke to a societal need to offer individuals—particularly those at odds with the prevailing social order or with little to gain from it—''whatever inducements or sanctions ... might be required to encourage virtue and discourage vice.' Desirous of making 'those sanctions as painless and uncoercive as possible,' the Victorians realized that 'the more effective the voluntary exercise of morality in the self (in the form of conscience, character, habit, or religion), the less need there would be for the external, punitive instruments of the state' (p. 51).

Spokespersons for positive psychology have denied that their claims are intended to have prescriptive force. Yet positive psychologists clearly endorse particular values, traits, and ways of being, and they cloak these endorsements in the mantle of science. Their discussions of virtue and character are reminiscent of how, in Americans' fervent embrace of science in 19th century, 'moralism ... drew upon the prestige of science, [and science] was pleased that its findings supported the dictates of morality' (Rosenberg, 1976/1997, p. 10). Moreover, some proponents of positive psychology express grand ambitions for large-scale social reform and declare themselves a 'movement' (Held, 2002). Indeed, Martin Seligman's 'Authentic Happiness' website boasts a Positive Psychology Anthem. This idea of a movement to produce

happy, virtuous, productive citizens brings to mind the mental hygiene movement, which had a widespread influence on American life from the early years of the 20th century through the 1940s.

The aim of the mental hygiene movement was nothing less than the attainment of physical and mental health by all US citizens. As stated in an early issue of the *Mental Hygiene Bulletin* (1923), a goal of the movement was 'to create a desire for health positive' among the citizenry (p. 4). The ideal was that of perfect adjustment to society, an ideal that doubled as a moral standard (Matthews, 1978). In 1930, Dr. Frederick A. Allen, a child psychiatrist and leading proponent, described the movement thus:

> Mental Hygiene is concerned with the development and preservation of those human values and achievements, which contribute to a balanced mental life for the individual. *The basis of its philosophy presupposes the existence of an ideal about the social order and the individuals who constitute it.* ... (1)... the need of a natural home life where the child can gain a sense of his own values from the relationships which develop between child and parent; (2) ... a sound body ... (3) ... an educational life that will insure the development of the abilities which he possesses and a chance in the community to establish healthy relationships with his fellow beings; (4) ... the need of each individual to develop his own love life according to his own needs, in keeping with the requirements of the social order unencumbered by conflicts which commonly carry over from the early period of life; ... (5) ... a continuing job life which should have a close relationship to the abilities of the individual. (as cited in Matthews, 1978, pp. 481–482, italics added)

Leaders of the mental hygiene movement made it plain that they planned to undertake scientific studies to ascertain 'the sources of human happiness and efficiency' (Matthews, 1978, p. 482) and to engage in educational crusades to restore health through helping individuals achieve a good adjustment to 'Reality.' Good adjustment consisted of 'acting to win the approval of a postulated community whose norms, once revised along hygienic lines, would be universal and unquestioned' (p. 476).

Like the mental hygienists, many proponents of positive psychology also use the language of adjustment. For example, Massimini and Delle Fave (2000) described the aim of intervention in cases of what they call the 'social maladjustment' of homeless people, drug addicts, and delinquent teenagers: 'The ultimate goal of intervention has to be the social reintegration of individuals by fostering the cultivation of culturally adaptive activities and life goals' (p. 30). Rehabilitation is intended to produce a 'creative and satisfied individual, who is integrated in the cultural environment and committed to the replication of its basic social values' (p. 28). Massimini and Delle Fave make no mention of altering 'maladjusted' environments—just of reforming 'maladjusted' individuals—and they do not allude to the multitude of macro- and micro-economic and socio-structural factors known to underlie homelessness, substance abuse, and adolescent antisocial behavior.

Like the mental hygienists, Seligman and Csikszentmihályi (2000b) urge social and behavioral scientists to 'show what actions lead to well-being, to positive individuals, and to thriving communities' and 'what kinds of families result in children who flourish' (p. 5). By locating the antecedents of human flourishing within the individual—in appropriate socialization, good behavior, and good cheer—they ignore how societal contexts regulate access to flourishing, limiting it only to privileged members of society. Nor do they ask how structural arrangements relate to human flourishing and well-being or how these arrangements contribute to the differing constructions of virtue and strengths. Mirroring Dr. Allen's focus on the mental life of the individual, his or her achievements, and conformity to prevailing norms, positive psychology joins the ranks of the adjustment psychologies that have preceded it.

Individual Fulfillment or Societal Flourishing?

In their manifesto, Seligman and Csikszentmihályi (2000b) do not include the interrogation of power, privilege, and social hierarchy as part of the agenda of positive psychology. They do not discuss how these might have anything to do with visions of the good life or with who can or cannot attain it. Nor do they express concern that some segments of the population may 'flourish' at the expense of others. Moreover, in their talk about human resilience and strengths, positive psychologists make no mention of a prominent professional group that has already learned much about these subjects: social work. For at least 25 years, social work, with its tradition of social activism and rich legacy of social engagement, has adopted a 'strengths perspective' that eschews a focus on human debility and human pathology (Saleeby, 1997).

Social workers have consistently decried the medicalization of human problems (Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; McQuaide, 1999; Wakefield, 2005). In contrast, the discipline of psychology is firmly entrenched in it. Textbooks in abnormal and clinical psychology are organized around the categorical system of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (American Psychiatric Association, 2002) and their language borrows heavily from biomedicine. The same is true of much clinical psychology research. The recent report of the APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice prides itself on its close imitation of the work of the Institute of Medicine (APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006). The Task Force members further note that they took pains to adopt language and concepts consistent with 'other areas of health care,' implying that clinical psychology is an area of health care (p. 273). Furthermore, many state psychological organizations are pressing for practitioners to gain the authority to prescribe medication. Some psychologists have mounted thoughtful and rigorous critiques of medicalization and the culture of biomedicine. But positive psychology has not, nor has it disentangled

itself from medicalized thinking. Indeed, even some enthusiasts have noted that the movement has never definitively opposed the medical model, raising the worry that 'positive psychology may only be relevant as an "extra" for those who are already capable of functioning' (Joseph & Linley, 2006, p. 333).

Social work research and practice offer a needed corrective to positive psychology. Rather than locating the sources of well-being solely within the individual, the discipline of social work studies individuals in the context of the social environment. Social workers insist on using what they learn to advocate for policies and programs that empower the disenfranchised. To examine individual lives embedded in real-life social and relational contexts is to uncover layers of complexity—not to mention *realpolitik*—that positive psychology's blanket assertions often seem to lack. Seligman and Csikszentmihályi's (2000b) manifesto aims 'to articulate a vision of the good life that is empirically sound while being *understandable and attractive*' (p. 5, italics added). But a vision of the good life for one segment of the population may not be so attractive to another. What might constitute a vision of the good life for the urban poor has hardly proven 'understandable and attractive' to the suburban middle class, for example, when the latter has had to consider taking on a greater tax burden in order to restore a crumbling inner city. Furthermore, considered as abstract qualities, such virtues and character strengths as valor, cheerfulness, optimism, mercy, gratitude, and forgiveness may seem unassailably positive or virtuous**.** But there are contexts in which anger is justified, forgiveness is not appropriate, demands for restitution take precedence over mercy, and sadness leads the sufferer to an existential truth. Indeed, there are circumstances, such as those surrounding the founding of America, in which treason and sedition are more honorable than patriotism and loyalty.

Knowledge of the experiences of subordinated groups and racialized individuals opens the way to textured and complex analyses of resilience, flourishing, and character strengths. Some psychologists have argued, for example, that it is vital that racialized children not be shielded from knowledge of the pervasive effects of racism on their communities (Ward, 1996). Such awareness, painful though it is, protects individuals' dignity. It may also enable them to forestall dangerous—even lethal—encounters with hostile members of the majority community (Fine, 1992). Constantine and Sue (2006) have further argued that because people of color have a history of struggling against adversity, they have adaptive strengths that are not part of White people's experience.

Across the world, social change movements have always valued critical consciousness, dissatisfaction, and righteous anger over gratitude and cheerfulness. The recognition of unfair treatment is crucial in circumstances where subordination has been naturalized and so goes unrecognized. The 'speak bitterness' (*su ku*) campaigns of Mao's revolutionary brigades, for example, were intended to produce knowledge that would arouse serfs to revolt against feudal landlords. The method of *conscientizacao* (conscientization), which was central to peasant liberation movements in Latin America, was an educational practice

intended to incite dissatisfaction among the oppressed (Freire, 1970/1984). The American feminist movement of the 1970s relied heavily on grass-roots consciousness-raising groups to instigate awareness and anger that would spur women to political action (Kravetz, Marecek, & Finn, 1983). All these social movements regarded themselves as promoting flourishing; however, their view of flourishing was not a limited person-centered one, but a view in which flourishing was inextricably tied to just and equitable social arrangements. In this regard, we can contrast the positive psychology movement with another contemporary movement in psychology, the critical psychology movement. Critical psychology—an outgrowth of Marxist psychology and radical psychology—examines the ways in which the technologies of discipline operate to sustain societal power differentials. Critical psychologists, notably Isaac Prilleltensky, have argued that resilience and well-being cannot be separated from social justice (Prilleltensky, 1994; Prilleltensky & Prilleltensky, 2005).

In our view, positive psychology's neglect of social context and its inadequate attention thus far to the experiences of diverse social groups, especially those in subordinated positions, result at least in part from its allegiance to certain epistemological and methodological commitments of North American psychology. Like most of conventional North American psychology, positive psychology typically has taken the individual as the object of study without regard for history, society, or culture. We briefly analyze a chapter from the *Handbook of Positive Psychology* entitled 'Relationship Connection' (Harvey, Pauwels, & Zickmund, 2002) to illustrate how the standpoint of conventional psychology forecloses certain kinds of understandings. The authors propose what they call the 'minding model' of relationships. Minding is comprised of five processes, one of which is reciprocity. The authors state that 'there needs to be a sense of equity in relationships, such that each partner receives benefits from the relationship roughly equal to the amount he or she contributes. ... Most romantic relationships involve people who are at least possible equals' (p. 428). But what, we ask, turns 'possible equals' into equals? The authors make no mention of the potent and ubiquitous ideology of domesticity that assigns to women the lion's share of domestic and relational labor in heterosexual relationships (Hochschild, 1989; J. Williams, 2000)**.** This ideology effectively conceals gender inequality, causing it to appear that men and women have equal power in heterosexual relationships (Goodrich, 1991; Hare-Mustin, 1978). Furthermore, stark inequities between men and women are often re-labeled as natural and inevitable differences between the sexes or as freely chosen preferences (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990). Harvey and colleagues (2002) pay no heed to three decades of research and theory on gender and heterosexual relationships. They seem oblivious to the male–female power differentials outside relationships that make equality inside heterosexual relationships all but impossible. Not unlike other studies performed by positive psychologists, theirs is a study of the personal absent the historical and socio-structural surround.

A Place in the Professional Sun

We have discussed positive psychology's embrace of individualism and individualism's offspring, self-actualization. No doubt this embrace partly accounts for its widespread popularity. But the movement also serves the profession of psychology at a critical time in its history. The pairing of the term 'positive' with 'psychology' not only suggests a relationship between the happiness ideal and personal life; it also creates a strong association between that happiness ideal and the discipline of psychology—it creates a professional 'smiley face.'

Joining the positive psychology crusade serves to insulate adherents from the critical and progressive psychologies that have emerged here and abroad, as well as from the dramatic changes in the social relations of the profession in the United States. In the past 30 years, people of color, White women, and people who do not identify as heterosexual have become visible and vocal within the profession. These psychologists have brought forward new research, practice, and advocacy agendas, which often emphasize social justice. Moreover, many psychologists have embraced the intellectual movements that have reshaped the humanities and social sciences over the past few decades—among them, feminism, critical race theory, queer theory, and postcolonial theory. They have questioned North American psychology's reigning epistemology and proposed alternative methods of producing knowledge. Some have challenged the politics of knowledge in the discipline. Positive psychology— the name itself a throwback to the 1950s (Maslow, 1954)—cleanly sidesteps decades of ferment and change as if they never happened.

Seligman and Csikszentmihályi's positive psychology manifesto (2000b) advanced an agenda for research. However, some psychotherapists quickly jumped on the positive psychology bandwagon. Already, strengths therapy, positive therapy, applied positive practice, and other artifacts have proliferated. There are handbooks, how-to articles, training workshops, and even a degree-granting program for would-be positive practitioners. The popularity of positive psychology among professional psychologists should not be surprising. Positive psychology offers a way out of a pressing dilemma. Recent decades have witnessed seismic changes in the landscape of professional psychology and shrinking opportunities for private practice (Herbert, 2006). Managed care, the re-emergence of a medicalized psychiatry, and Big Pharma have profoundly altered mental health practice, leading to fewer clients, lowered income, and diminished job satisfaction. Many believe that the field of psychotherapy can survive only if it reinvents itself. Psychologists' campaign to gain prescribing authority is one such reinvention. The explosion of interest in life coaching, executive coaching, and personal development coaching is another. Positive psychotherapy (aka applied positive practice) is another invention that addresses the threat of professional extinction. Unlike prescribing

authority, it remains 'psychological,' thus retaining practitioners within the discipline. Unlike coaching, it can claim to be based on psychological science.

The notion of applied positive psychology addresses another problem of psychological practitioners: psychology's perennial struggle for legitimacy—its 'quandary of the quacks' (Morawski & Hornstein, 1991). Positive psychology's allegiance to science draws an emphatic distinction between 'expert' help and popular self-help culture, a time-tested strategy for claiming legitimacy. For more than a century, the therapeutic professions have invoked science and scientific method in their efforts to enlarge their sphere of influence and to drive out non-professionals (Caplan, 1998; Hale, 1971). Given the critiques of humanistic psychology leveled by Seligman and Csikszentmihályi (2000b), particularly with regard to the myriad self-help movements that the movement spawned, it is ironic that their efforts to expand the terrain of applied psychology practice parallel those of humanistic psychologists in the 1960s (Herman, 1995). Indeed, the opening section of Maslow's *Toward a Psychology of Being* (1962) was entitled 'A Larger Jurisdiction for Psychology.' Moreover, positive psychology has already given birth to a swarm of media pundits, self-help gurus, and advice books, many written by Seligman himself.

Positive psychology has not only garnered adherents among psychologists. It has also generated a popular discourse that performs ideological work for US society at large. A time-honored, quintessentially American way of dealing with collective uncertainty and demoralization has been to turn our energies ever more forcefully to the quest for private success and the American Dream. Positive psychology—with its rosy promises of producing happy, successful, and upright citizens—offers a respite from post-9/11 anxieties and national self-doubt. It is indeed a psychology for our times.

It is a sad irony that Seligman and Csikszentmihályi (2000b) opened their germinal article on positive psychology with this encomium: ' … the US is on the pinnacle of political and economic leadership' (p. 5). On September 11, 2001, such nationalistic hubris was dealt a severe blow, affirming the wisdom of the Buddha's teachings on the impermanence of all things. Now, seven years after Seligman and Csikszentmihályi penned those words, Americans' belief in the impregnability of the United States has crumbled; their faith in the wisdom and integrity of their political leaders is at low ebb; their trust in corporate leaders has been shaken by the onslaught of scandals; and the country's economic supremacy is on the wane. Much of the world seems set against the United States. They are daily confronted with news of incipient terrorist attacks, looming pandemics, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this historical moment, a revived investment in person-centered happiness, optimism, cheerfulness, gratitude, and virtue would seem to make perfect sense.

Conclusion

We have argued that our understanding of positive psychology as a cultural arti-fact can be deepened by examining its entrenchment in North American ideolo-gies and traditions, popular as well as professional. Our historical reckoning has demonstrated positive psychology's indebtedness to a distinctly American strain of individualism as well as its kinship with earlier movements that have sought to promote health, happiness, and adjustment. We have also suggested that positive psychology solves some important problems for present-day psychologists, both researchers and practitioners. By problematizing new aspects of human 'being,' it stakes out new territory for psychology. Mapping the territory of virtue, 'flow,' flourishing, and happiness is said to demand expertise that only psychological researchers can offer. At the same time, attaining happiness, individual strength, and good character is purported to require the application of therapeutic and other technologies that only highly trained professionals can deliver.

   William James is often invoked as a champion of positive psychology. However, a close reading of James's writings on the 'mind cure' movements of his day shows him to have been less than sanguine about the gospel of healthy-mindedness. No more for James than for Freud was contentment the end-goal of human development. James (1902/1994) asserted: 'Like every other emotional state, [happiness] has blindness and insensibility to opposing facts ... as its instinctive weapon for self-protection against disturbance' (p. 101). In his view, happiness should not be anesthetic; there was nothing to be gained by denying evil, conflict, and disease (Meyer, 1965). Neither, in our view, is it sufficient to consider the person or the family as a locus of flour-ishing, happiness, and virtue, while ignoring the state of the larger social, cul-tural and political environment. We advocate not for *a* new movement in psychology, but for *movement* in psychology to a new vantage point that brings the larger environment fully into view.

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